The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative law in International Institutions by Benvenisti, Eyal
112905 10_BENVENISTI.DOC 1/10/2006 10:33 AM 
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OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
EYAL BENVENISTI* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Delegating authority to administrative agencies makes up for the generality 
of the law.  Because the legislature cannot address every contingency, or simply 
wishes to stay clear of issues that are politically or socially sensitive, it delegates 
authority to its administrative agents.  However, such delegation of authority 
endows administrative agents with wide discretion, discretion that breeds con-
cerns of unaccountability, recklessness, and corruption.  Administrative law is 
designed to address such concerns by curbing agents’ discretion through the 
structuring of the decisionmaking process, by providing procedural transpar-
ency and voice to affected groups, and by setting up review mechanisms, includ-
ing judicial review.  Inevitably, such attempts produce new discretionary powers  
which new rules are then designed to control and curb.  These new rules in turn 
create new discretionary powers, and so on, creating a “cat and mouse” game 
between principal and agents that can continue indefinitely.  As Martin Shapiro 
explains, administrative law is “an endless game of catch-up in which previously 
granted discretions are brought under rules even as new discretions are granted, 
and no discretion granted is ever completely and finally reduced to rules.”1 
Who authors those norms that attempt to constrain administrative discre-
tion?  Authorship depends on the balance of power between the different ac-
tors in the domestic body politic.  For example, a legislature that seeks to shape 
the outcome of executive decisionmaking will use administrative law for that 
purpose, thereby creating elaborate statutory provisions that constrain adminis-
trative discretion.  In contrast, a disinterested or captured legislature that sur-
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renders policymaking to the executive will tend to produce relatively ineffective 
administrative law.  But, in this case, other actors may step in and influence the 
evolution of the law.  The executive itself may wish to restrain at least some of 
its agencies by rules that the public can enforce. 
The judiciary, which has a will and means of its own to impose constraints 
on administrative agencies, is also an important actor.  Indeed, when lawmakers 
defer to the executive with no strings attached, courts often fill the gaps with ju-
dicially invented rules.  This judicial activism depends in turn on the level of 
court involvement that the legislature and executive will tolerate.  Thus, admin-
istrative law, perhaps more than any other area of law, reflects most accurately 
each country’s balance of power between the various branches of government. 
International institutions constitute another arena for the evolution of ad-
ministrative law.  In recent years, more and more legislative discretion has been 
delegated not to domestic agents but to international—both regional or 
global—institutions.  Often the same domestic groups that influence legislators 
to delegate authority to the domestic executive use their weight to induce their 
governments to join an international institution that enjoys decisionmaking 
powers vis-à-vis its member states.2  However, since such institutions do not 
have the paradigmatic division of powers that characterizes democracies—
legislative, executive, and judicial branches—the characteristics of international 
administrative law differ from domestic administrative law.  As a result, certain 
principles of domestic administrative and constitutional law will not necessarily 
apply to international bodies.  For example, the requirement that courts must 
be established by primary legislation, a requirement found in many domestic 
constitutions that reflects important democratic guarantees provided by the leg-
islative process, is often irrelevant in the context of an international body, 
whose constitution and procedures rely to a lesser extent on a legislative body.3  
Nonetheless, to the extent that treaties assign responsibilities and delegate deci-
sionmaking powers to treaty bodies, issues of international administrative law 
similar to issues of domestic administrative law will arise.  As in domestic ad-
ministrative law, the administrative law of an international institution will result 
from enactments of the state parties (in the treaty establishing the institution), 
from various kinds of inputs of their executive organs, and from decisions of 
their adjudicative bodies.  The principal-agent tensions that exist between the 
lawmaker and the executive in the domestic arena are also found in the interna-
tional arena between the state parties and the different treaty-bodies and be-
tween the parties within each of the treaty-bodies.  Hence, like domestic admin-
istrative law, which reflects the domestic political balance of power, the law 
 
 2. Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167 (1999). 
 3. In explaining the legality of the Security Council’s establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the tribunal noted that “the constitutional structure of the 
United Nations does not follow the division of powers often found in national constitutions.”  Prosecu-
tor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, at ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia 1995) (on file 
with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
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constraining the discretion of the various actors within the international institu-
tion will reflect the specific balance of powers between the state parties and the 
balance of power within each international institution. 
As more institutions engage in administrative lawmaking for themselves, 
and as they interact with other institutions, it is likely that cross-institutional 
pressures will create a pull towards conformity with general rules of administra-
tive law.4  This pull will result either from relatively powerful institutions, ones 
that condition deference to the acts of other institutions on those other institu-
tions’ respect to general administrative norms, or from an emerging culture of 
shared administrative norms that actors may find difficult to bargain away.  
Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the opportunity to im-
pose procedural obligations upon states, whether through the restatement of 
customary international law or the interpretation of treaties.  As such, the ICJ is 
in a unique position to change the default rules for state parties who negotiate 
treaties that establish institutions. 
At the same time, actors who dread being subjected to administrative law 
within international institutions will certainly learn from the experience gained 
in other institutions in which administrative law has developed unexpectedly.  
Because the dynamics of international institutions are a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, even seasoned negotiators failed to realize the consequences of their 
bargains.  There is ample evidence, for example, that the parties who sought to 
establish the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) did not 
anticipate the significant role that body would have beyond the settlement of 
trade disputes.5  Consequently, actors concerned with the scope of international 
administrative law could, for example, limit the role of the institution’s adjudi-
cative bodies, which as this article demonstrates, have proven to be active pro-
moters of administrative norms.  From the perspective of this article, these 
cross-institutional influences and pressures are taken into consideration as fac-
tors among those that influence the positions of the state parties and the inter-
nal organs of the institution. 
 
 4. I thank Benedict Kingsbury for this suggestion. 
 5. See J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal 
and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 9 (2000) (“From 
interviews with many delegations I have conducted it is clear that, as mentioned above, they saw the 
logic of the Appellate Body as a kind of Super-Panel to give a losing party another bite at the cherry, 
given that the losing party could no longer block adoption of the Panel.  It is equally clear to me that 
they did not fully understand the judicial let alone [the] constitutional nature of the Appellate Body.”), 
at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/000901-04.html#P158_56413; Richard H. Steinberg, 
Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
247, 251 n.27 (2004) (“A few WTO DSU negotiators contemplated the possibility that in interpreting 
WTO agreements, the Appellate Body would engage in expansive lawmaking. However, most trade 
ministers consistently underestimated or dismissed that possibility, focusing instead on the virtues of its 
function of applying the rules. . . . After the Uruguay Round agreements were signed, some members of 
the U.S. Congress expressed serious concern about the potential for judicial lawmaking, Senator 
Robert Dole going so far as to propose the establishment of a special U.S. commission to review certain 
Appellate Body decisions.”). 
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This article identifies and discusses the interaction between actors within in-
ternational institutions as a determinant of the evolution of administrative law 
in those institutions.  To that end, this article first outlines the different motiva-
tions for the development of domestic administrative law (Part II).  This analy-
sis provides the background for an attempt to identify the factors that shape the 
evolution of administrative law in international institutions (Part III).  Part IV 
tests whether the evolution of international administrative law in the European 
Union (E.U.), the WTO, and the United Nations (U.N.) confirms theoretical 
expectations.  Finally, Part V addresses the role of the ICJ in developing inter-
national administrative law in general.  Part VI concludes by asserting that the 
comparative study of the evolution of administrative law in international insti-
tutions should not assume facile comparisons and generalities, but must be sen-
sitive to the specific political constraints, to the factors influencing the balance 
of power within each institution, and to the balance of power amongst state par-
ties to the institution.  Any attempt to develop a unified administrative interna-
tional law must remain acutely attuned to the specific constraints within each 
institution. 
II 
THE THEORY ON THE EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
In their seminal paper,6 McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (McNollgast) argue 
that the U.S. Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 19467 reflected the inter-
est of Congress to rein in the administration.  The central idea of the McNoll-
gast theory is simple:  members of Congress wished to have an impact on the 
policies adopted by the administration.8  To compensate for the relative institu-
tional deficiencies that precluded active monitoring of the executive, Congress 
invented procedural rules that made it easier for individual citizens to enforce 
these rules through litigation.  In other words, lawmakers used the citizens as 
agents in their competition with the executive.9  The McNollgast theory of the 
evolution of administrative law describes a joint venture of constraining the 
powerful administration through the combined action of the legislature that 
produces the rules, the public that invokes the rules, and the courts that inter-
pret and enforce those rules. 
The McNollgast theory, however, assumes a legislature and a judiciary that 
are both independent of the executive branch.  Although in the U.S. Congress is 
indeed independent of the President, legislatures in many other countries are 
not.  Particularly in parliamentary democracies, such as those in Europe and 
 
 6. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger C. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as In-
struments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); see also McNollgast, The Political Ori-
gins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999). 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
 8. McCubbins et al., supra note 6, at 244. 
 9. Id. at 255. 
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elsewhere, the legislature is often quite deferential to the executive.10  In par-
liamentary democracies political parties often straddle the divide between the 
executive and the legislative branches.  Thus, whoever controls the party con-
trols its members both in the executive and in the legislature.  The members of 
the executive body—usually the seniors of the political party—have the power 
to influence the reelection chances of their less powerful party members who 
serve as legislators.  Although internal party politics is the glue that binds indi-
vidual legislators to their bigger brothers and sisters in the executive, it also 
serves to undermine much of the formal law on checks and balances.11  As a re-
sult, despite the formal independence that legislatures and courts enjoy in all 
democracies, the political reality is often different.  Lawmakers may be depend-
ent on the executive through party discipline, and judges through the execu-
tive’s power of appointment and promotion.  In such circumstances, the execu-
tive reigns supreme.12  This fundamental assumption of an independent 
legislature and judiciary undermines the ability of the McNollgast theory to of-
fer predictions as to the evolution of administrative law in the political envi-
ronment of parliamentary systems.  Nonetheless, surprisingly vigorous systems 
of administrative law operate in many parliamentary democracies. 
The evolution of vigorous administrative law in parliamentary democracies 
is in part due to the desire of the ruling executive to have formal or real review 
of its own exercise of authority.  Indeed, politicians have several good reasons 
to prescribe administrative law and to provide for judicial review of their own 
actions.  Administrative law and adjudication provide legitimacy to the institu-
tions.13  Law and litigation may provide politicians with control over bureaucra-
cies that they cannot obtain through party discipline (for example, when the bu-
reaucrats are professionals and not party members), or over political 
subcomponents such as provinces, regional authorities, and municipalities.14  
Politicians use the delegation of authority to indirectly empower the courts to 
impose, through judicial review of administrative action, unpopular policies that 
 
 10. MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9 (1995) (de-
scribing the dependency of the legislator on the executive in a Westminster parliamentary system). 
 11. Eyal Benvenisti, Party Primaries as Collective Action with Constitutional Ramifications: Israel 
as a Case Study, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 175 (2002) (describing the impact of the introduc-
tion of party primaries in Israel on the power relations between the executive and the legislature). 
 12. See Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. 
LEGIS. STUD. 721 (1994). 
 13. ROGER COTTERRELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 169-171 (2d ed. 1992); Gerald Frug, The Ide-
ology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1334 (1984). See also Tom Ginsburg, 
Dismantling the “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea, 49 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 585, 597 (2001) (suggesting that the motivation for the enactment of the Korean Adminis-
trative Appeals Act of 1984 was President Chun Doo Hwan’s attempt to gain legitimacy for his gov-
ernment). 
 14. See, e.g., J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 217-18 (1999) (describing how politicians of the ruling LDP party sought control over local 
bureaucracy through judicial review of local government). 
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the politicians themselves are not strong enough to endorse.15  When political 
power tends to fluctuate between coalitions, administrative rules that constrain 
future decisionmakers can offer enacted policies a longer life span.16  Finally, 
politicians often realize that the enforcement of administrative law leaves much 
to be desired, and that failing to enforce it will on many occasions yield no ad-
verse consequences to them.  Moreover, if the courts do bite too hard, the poli-
ticians can always try, and are often able, to influence the legislature to undo 
their decisions. 
At times, administrative case law develops in ways that the executive finds 
excessively restricting, and yet the executive faces difficulties in overcoming 
those restraints.  Therefore, a complete account of the evolution of administra-
tive law requires analysis into courts’ motivations.  Indeed, courts are also 
agents with their own set of incentives.  For example, although the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA)17 is the creation of Congress, the U.S. courts have ac-
tually transformed the meaning of crucial parts of the APA through their inter-
pretation of it,18 a fact that went unnoticed by McNollgast.  Courts that are 
dependent on the executive will develop administrative law to the extent that 
the executive wishes them to do so,19 but independent courts are likely to revel 
in the gaps left by the legislature and to constrain politicians even against their 
will.  Their motivations to do so may stem from a variety of reasons:  judges 
may perceive their role as that of correcting the deficiencies of the political 
process; they may seek outcomes that they perceive as beneficial to the specific 
litigants or to society at large; or they may seek to strengthen their own institu-
tional and even personal reputations.  But why would an executive that controls 
a legislature and seeks only marginal judicial activism, tolerate judicial inde-
pendence with its concomitant constraints on administrative discretion? 
Perhaps the political branches are internally divided, and therefore the 
transaction costs of adapting and modifying judge-made administrative norms 
are high.  Often such a “legislative impasse” precludes legislation in the sphere 
of administrative law.  When lawmakers cannot agree on the adoption of spe-
cific rules, such as transparency or voice to non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in administrative procedures, by default such rules are not enacted.  
This inability to form a majority to enact such norms may similarly constrain 
lawmakers in undoing such norms after they have been adopted by the court.  
Legislative impasse empowers the courts, and judges are often sensitive to, and 
strive to exploit, this inertia.  Moreover, judges are often emboldened to change 
 
 15. Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We 
Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 361-62 (1993). 
 16. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 613-14 (“Parties that govern for an extended period have less 
need to rely on independent courts as monitors because they will be able to manipulate bureaucrat[s’] 
careers and develop other alternative means of control.”); see also McCubbins et. al., supra note 6. 
 17. See supra note 7. 
 18. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 11. 
 19. See generally RAMSEYER & NAKAZOTO, supra note 14, at 191-219 (analyzing the evolution of 
Japanese administrative law in a system in which judges are controlled by politicians). 
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the legal status quo, knowing that they will not be overruled.  The more dif-
fused the power is among lawmakers, the more room there is for an active judi-
ciary,20 and the more the courts will engage in administrative lawmaking.  
Though derived from the evolution of domestic administrative law, this logic, as 
argued below, is also a central explanation for the contemporary evolution of 
international administrative law. 
III 
THE EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN  
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
The factors that explain the evolution of administrative law within democra-
cies also explain the evolution of international administrative law.  Because 
administrative law is a method for restraining actors, and therefore a reflection 
of the balance of power among actors within political institutions, the law on 
decisionmaking within an international institution should reflect the interplay 
between the actors that participate in the decisionmaking process within that in-
stitution.  In such institutions there are three main actors:  first, the govern-
ments that represent the state parties to the treaties establishing the institutions; 
second, domestic interest groups, such as domestic institutions that compete 
with their governments domestically (independent legislatures or courts, oppo-
sition parties, or NGOs representing civil society), who wish to voice their views 
independently of their governments in the international arena;21 and third, offi-
cials of the institution itself (bureaucrats and judges) who enjoy discretionary 
powers under the rules of the institution. 
A. Inter-State Competition 
Generally speaking, constraints on the decisionmaking process tend to re-
duce power disparities between strong and weak actors.22  Hence, disparity in 
power relations among state parties to an international institution is a key fac-
 
 20. See John Ferejohn, The Law of Politics: Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 55-60 (2002) (explaining that the “fragmentation of power” within the political 
branches has led to increased judicial activism); see also Nicos C. Alivizatos, Judges as Veto Players, in 
PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 566 (Herbert Doering ed., 1995) (docu-
menting statistically the legislative impasse). 
 21. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (All states play a “two-level game.”).  On the interaction between domestic in-
terests groups across political boundaries, see Benvenisti, supra note 2. 
 22. J. H. H. Weiler, supra note 5. A recent example of this in the area of trade can be seen in the 
WTO panel ruling in favor of Antigua and against the U.S.  WTO Panel Rules in Favour of Antigua, 
Barbuda in Gambling Dispute, BRIDGES: WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Nov. 17, 2004 (on file with 
Law & Contemp. Probs.), at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-11-17/story5.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 
2005); Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the Experience of 
Peru and Vietnam, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association (2003) (describing instances in which the WTO dispute resolution rules helped to level the 
playing field for developing countries) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~cldavis/files/ davis_WTO_and_developing_countries.pdf (last visited Feb. 
15, 2005). 
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tor influencing the parties’ inclination to adopt administrative norms that con-
strain collective decisionmaking.  Whereas stronger parties may wish to use 
their muscle to impose their will at the bargaining table, accountability and 
transparency might hamper their efforts.  Because sheer power can never be a 
valid justification for decisions, an obligation to give reasons for a decision has 
certain—if only marginal—effects on reasoned decisions.  Power does not trans-
late itself easily into law. 
Nonetheless, powerful states that wish to control the outcome of collective 
decisions still have several options.  One is to resist any florescence of adminis-
trative law.  This is often the case when the most basic interests of these power-
ful states are at stake, and they want to control the outcome.  For example, the 
Permanent Five veto holders at the Security Council strongly oppose a more 
transparent decisionmaking process at the U.N. Security Council.23  Another op-
tion is to construct the process in ways that privilege their interests.  If stronger 
states can set up reliable treaty bodies that can be expected to conform to their 
interests, it makes sense to delegate authority to such bodies and to subse-
quently constrain them through administrative law.  Through this legalization of 
the decisionmaking process, not only will the powerful states secure the desired 
outcome, but the outcome itself will have the benefit of being legitimized by the 
process.  Yet another option is to agree on a formal decisionmaking process, 
while manipulating the outcome by threatening to disregard the outcomes or 
even to exit the institution.  On the other hand, the relatively weaker states will 
have, all other things being equal, exactly the opposite interests.  Trying to 
minimize disparities in power, they will demand strong administrative provi-
sions that constrain outcomes, or extract side payments for their support of 
stronger states. 
In many institutions one finds a variegated approach that reflects the inter-
est of the state parties to delegate authority in some matters but retain control 
over decisionmaking in other matters.  Consequently, stronger interests in so-
phisticated administrative law are often found in those areas of delegated au-
thority but not in other areas.  The U.N., for example, is an institution whose 
bureaucracy enjoys extensive delegated authority in the context of employee 
discipline but has little authority in the context of the discretionary powers of 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII to determine whether a threat to 
international peace and security exists and how to accommodate it.  In the for-
mer case, one finds elaborate rules on employees’ rights and obligations and an 
effective judicial review body,24 while in the latter case, the Permanent Five will 
 
 23. See David M. Malone, The Security Council in the Post-Cold War Era: A Study in the Creative 
Interpretation of the U.N. Charter, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 487, 503-04 (2003) (describing the adop-
tion by the Permanent Five of private deliberations closed to other members of the Security Council); 
see also infra Part IV.C (on the evolution of administrative law within the U.N.). 
 24. The U.N. Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) was established by the General Assembly Resolu-
tion 351 of 9 December 1949 as an independent organ to pass judgments relating to the governance of 
U.N. staff members.  G.A. Res. 351, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc.A/RES/351(IV) (1949).  In fact, 
several international institutions (including the World Bank, the IMF, and the League of Arab States) 
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likely object to the evolution of any formal rules constraining their discretion as 
well as to any judicial review functions.25 
B. Domestic Competition 
Competition between domestic interest groups, as well as between the or-
gans of government, produces robust systems of domestic administrative law, 
and competitors of the executive intent to control it are those who design it.  
However, the executive enjoys more opportunities to overcome domestic re-
straints when it acts in the international sphere, largely through closed-door ne-
gotiations with other governments that are traditionally shielded from public 
scrutiny.  When the product—a treaty or an informal agreement—is brought 
before the domestic organs for ratification, it is presented as a “take it or leave 
it” option, with little information about the feasibility of alternatives.  Opaque 
inter-state bargaining privileges the participating governments to the disadvan-
tage of their competing domestic actors.26  As a result, these competing domestic 
actors will be wary of the opportunities granted to the government to influence, 
or even preempt, outcomes that have domestic effects through decisions taken 
at the level of an international institution.  Unless they can otherwise rely on 
improving the existing domestic systems of administrative control, domestic ac-
tors will insist on a more elaborate administrative law within the international 
institution to provide sufficient control of the outcomes at that level.  All else 
being equal, democratic states with effective domestic checks and balances will 
have a stronger interest than non-democratic states, or states with weaker do-
mestic political competition, in elaborate administrative norms constraining the 
decisionmaking processes within the international institution. 
Alternatively, competing domestic actors could opt for more effective do-
mestic means of controlling the activities of the international institution.  One 
possibility is direct participation in the international bargaining process.  The 
involvement of the U.S. Congress in treaty negotiations in the so-called “fast 
track” procedure is an example of this.27  Another possibility would be for do-
mestic courts to review decisions of the international organization.  Indeed, as 
 
have created tribunals to deal with internal labor disputes, and the International Labour Organization’s 
Administrative Tribunal is also authorized to hear disputes arising from other institutions. JAN 
KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 269-73 (2002); see also 
CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 323-67 (1996) (discussing the law of employment relations in international institu-
tions). 
 25. See, e.g., infra Part IV. C (on the role of the ICJ as the judicial organ of the U.N.). 
 26. Benvenisti, supra note 2, at 177-89. 
 27. Under this procedure, the President agrees to involve Congress in the negotiation phase of 
trade agreements in return for a bicameral congressional commitment to vote the agreement up or 
down without amendment.  Congress’s involvement at the negotiation phase limits the discretion of 
government negotiators in the international bargaining process and provides more voice to groups that 
are less influential with the Executive, although the President continues to control the agenda.  Ben-
venisti, supra note 2, at 186-87; see also Harold H. Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 
18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 143 (1992) (describing the “Fast Track” procedure, its role in NAFTA trade 
talks, and its future viability). 
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Richard Stewart suggests, “[i]n the absence of any effective remedy at the level 
of the international regime, domestic courts may seek to directly review the le-
gality of the international regulatory decisions that directly impact specific per-
sons in the United States and elsewhere.”28  These expectations, however, must 
take into account several impediments.  First, research so far indicates that do-
mestic courts tend to exercise their authority very cautiously when examining 
the performance of their governments in the international political arena.29  
Second, such interference will have limited effect if the institution and other 
states refuse to recognize the outcome of the litigation in the domestic court 
and insist on compliance from the government.  Third, such interference is 
likely to entail adverse effects for the economy of the state whose court starts 
intervening in the decisions of international institutions.  Such interventions 
may have spillover effects on the operation of many other international institu-
tions acting within the jurisdiction of the court.  These institutions will view this 
judicial assertiveness as a significant drawback to doing business within the ju-
risdiction, and may consider moving to or investing in more amenable environ-
ments.  This appears to be the primary reason domestic courts hesitate before 
venturing to interfere with the activities of international institutions.  From the 
decision of the London courts not to entertain the suit against the bankrupt In-
ternational Tin Council,30 to the decision of the Dutch court in The Hague not 
to review the legality of the Security Council’s Resolution setting up the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY),31 domestic courts often sig-
nal—including to each other—that they will hesitate before cooperating to pro-
vide this public good.  The contrast between domestic court hesitancy on the 
one hand and the assertiveness of international tribunals (discussed below) on 
the other, suggests that the better strategy for the domestic opposition is to de-
vote considerable resources to influencing international tribunals rather than 
domestic ones. 
C. Intra-Institutional Competition 
Interstate competition and domestic competition are responsible for shaping 
the design of the decisionmaking process within the institution.  But once the 
institution has been created, it has a life of its own, with the internal allocation 
 
 28. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Resource for Global Administrative Law 24 
(Jan. 17, 2004) (discussion draft) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), at  
http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/spring04/globalization/ stewart_012604.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 
2005). 
 29. Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analy-
sis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 159 (1993); Mattias Kumm, International Law in 
National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 19 (2003). 
 30. In the wake of the collapse of the London-based International Tin Council, claims of individual 
debtors were rejected owing to the immunity enjoyed by the organization. See J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. 
Dep’t of Trade & Indus., [1990] 2 A. C. 418 (H.L. 1990). 
 31. Slobodan Milosevic v. The State of The Netherlands, 41 I.L.R. 86 (Dist. Ct. Civ. L. Div. 2001) 
(The Hague). 
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of authority a significant factor in shaping the development of the institution.  
The more divergent the interests among state parties to the institution, the 
more decisionmaking is relegated to the treaty bodies; and the more checks and 
balances there are between competing bodies within the institution, the more 
elaborate is the administrative law that develops.  At one end of the range of 
possible institutions, we find those institutions with a strong bureaucracy to 
which much discretion has been assigned.  The E.U., for example, is often criti-
cized for that very reason.  At the opposite end are institutions whose bureauc-
racy has mainly fact-finding functions and very few discretionary powers due to 
the desire of some or all parties to retain tight control over decisions. 
While there is a wide array of international institutions, with varying degrees 
of delegated authority to internal bureaucracies, many of them share a common 
denominator—namely, the relatively high bargaining costs of enacting adminis-
trative rules.  States that negotiate a treaty establishing an international institu-
tion will often have different interests, different domestic constraints, and, as a 
result, different expectations from the institution and from the functioning of its 
bureaucracy.  This often leads to a legislative impasse, in which the lawmakers 
cannot overcome the default rules of international law that so far offer only 
very limited administrative law.32  While such differences may be glossed over in 
the establishing treaty, they resurface in the institution’s routine work.  Usually, 
members of the judicial organs of such institutions are not career judges like 
their domestic counterparts and hence are relatively more independent of the 
executive.  As a result, one can expect that judicial organs in such institutions, 
when such organs exist, will contribute significantly to the evolution of adminis-
trative law.  Although powerful states may try to influence such outcomes by 
controlling the appointment of judges, or by threats of cutting funds or exit, the 
effectiveness of doing so may at times be limited and the costs prohibitive. 
The relative independence of such international adjudicators can prompt 
them to seize the opportunity to affect policy outcomes at variance with gov-
ernmental interests.  It is important to note that the evolution of administrative 
law—through, for example, voice given to politically disenfranchised groups—
may have distributional and other substantive implications.  And whereas gov-
ernments may aspire to reduce restrictions on international trade, adjudicators 
may be concerned with distributional or environmental implications of laissez-
faire policies and hence develop procedural rules that give more voice to such 
concerns.  A more structured decisionmaking process within the WTO “en-
hances the mobilization of antitrade forces relative to the already well-
organized pro-trade groups.”33  Hence, “legalization could undermine liberaliza-
tion.”34  Procedural guarantees are, of course, extremely important to the deli-
cate balancing of security and freedom, and it is in this context that the internal 
 
 32. On the possible development of such rules, see infra Part V. 
 33. Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A 
Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 606 (2000). 
 34. Id. 
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processes of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), established pursuant to 
Resolution 1373 of the U.N. Security Council, has come under serious criticism 
for not providing these basic procedural guarantees.35 
D. The Interaction Among Inter-state Competition, Domestic Competi-
tion, and Intra-Institutional Competition 
These three clusters of factors—inter-state, domestic, and intera-
institutional competition—shape the evolution of administrative law within 
each international institution in different ways.  For most states participating in 
an international institution, some factors work in favor of stricter rules and 
some against.  For other states, the preference for or against administrative 
rules will depend on the issue at hand.  Developing countries will be interested, 
for example, in greater transparency in the internal proceedings of the U.N. Se-
curity Council, but at the same time resist efforts to open up the WTO proc-
esses to third parties and NGOs. 
This analysis suggests that because international institutions vary, the ad-
ministrative law that develops within each of them will reflect the specific politi-
cal dynamics surrounding them.  “Like-minded” states without significant 
power disparities will allow for little legislative impasse.  The more diverse the 
composition of an institution, the more discord about procedure will be found, 
and hence the legislative impasse that will be created to preclude agreement on 
administrative law within the institution.  Given diversity among state parties, 
internal treaty bodies of the international institution can be expected to exploit 
the legislative impasse to develop administrative law endogenously.  This is true 
in particular of the judicial organs of such institutions that draw on the silence 
of the lawmakers and the divergence of opinion among state parties to develop 
strong administrative judge-made law.  This suggests that state parties to an in-
ternational institution, who have a strong interest in establishing administrative 
norms to control or subdue a runaway bureaucracy, can certainly expect the co-
operation of the judicial organs of the institution, if such are created, in the evo-
lution of such norms.  Parties who dread administrative constraints will resist 
the establishment of adjudicative functions or maintain tight controls over their 
appointment and limit judges’ terms in office. 
Hence, the comparative study of administrative law in international institu-
tions must be undertaken with great sensitivity to the factors influencing the 
balance of powers within the institution as well as within the parties to the insti-
tution.  An attempt to develop a unified international administrative law must 
remain very much attuned to the specific constraints within each institution. 
 
 35. For criticism of these opaque procedures, see Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law 
Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 873, 874-78 (2003). 
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IV 
THEORY AND ACTUAL PRACTICE:  
THE EXAMPLES OF THE E.U., THE WTO, AND THE U.N. 
A. The E.U. 
The evolution of administrative law within the E.U. is well documented.36  
The lack of administrative law in the establishing treaties has been comple-
mented by the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and especially 
the Court of First Instance.  The motivation for this evolution can be traced to 
the national governments’ potentially divergent attitudes towards the exercise 
of discretion by a powerful E.U. bureaucracy.  Governments that have a limited 
interest in domestic administrative law because they feel they control the out-
come of domestic processes have a much stronger interest in E.U. administra-
tive law because they feel they do not control the outcome of the processes 
within the E.U.  However, not all governments have similar interests, and thus 
few rules have been enacted in the treaties.  Instead, it is the court that enters 
the legal void created by the silent treaties and divergent governmental inter-
ests, using the legislative impasse to maintain its role in strengthening the rule 
of law within the organization.37 
In the E.U. context, administrative rules also gradually reflect a strong in-
terest from within the member states to constrain the Union’s decisionmaking 
process.  This interest derives from the realization of domestic actors that the 
domestic processes do not adequately offer voice and do not provide sufficient 
control against government discretion at the level of the E.U.  Constituencies 
seek to open up channels of communication as one of the ways to substitute for 
elections,38 which, for example, was the basis for the German Constitutional 
Court’s approval of Germany’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.39  In an in-
tegrated E.U., reasoned the Court, the demand for democracy would be satis-
fied if the Union provided an “ongoing free interaction of social forces, inter-
ests, and ideas, in the course of which political objectives are also clarified and 
modified, and as a result of which public opinion moulds political policy.”40  To 
 
 36. Giacinto della Cananea, Beyond the State: The Europeanization and Globalization of 
Procedural Administrative Law, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 563 (2003); Francesca Bignami, Three Generations of 
Participation Rights in European Administrative Proceedings, Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 11 
(2003), at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/031101.pdf; see also Francesca Bignami, The 
Administrative State in a Separation of Powers Constitution: Lessons for European Community 
Rulemaking from the United States (Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 5, 1999), at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990501.html. 
 37. Shapiro notes that “judicial activism in administrative review comes fairly easily to courts that 
are active in constitutional review.”  Shapiro, supra note 1, at 18. 
 38. On this trade-off see Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics, Inst. Int’l L. Jus. Working Paper 2004/7 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
at http://www.iilj.org/papers/2004/ 2004.7%20Grant %20Keohane.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
 39. Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision Concerning the Maastricht Treaty, of October 12, 
1993, 2BvR 92, 2134 (F.R.G.), translated in 33 I.L.M. 388, 420 (1994).   
 40. Id. 
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preserve democracy, in the Court’s view, “it is essential that both the decision-
making process amongst those institutions which implement sovereign power 
and the political objectives in each case should be clear and comprehensible to 
all, and also that the enfranchised citizen should be able to use its own language 
in communicating with the sovereign power to which it is subject.”41  Govern-
ments seeking domestic approval of an ever-closer union through treaties that 
in some countries are subject to referenda find it necessary to address such con-
cerns.  When they do not, domestic actors can resort to judicial proceedings to 
promote this interest. 
B. The WTO 
The debate within the WTO about administrative law reflects a strong 
North-South division.  A legislative impasse has resulted that has enabled the 
organization’s main adjudicative body, the Appellate Body (AB), to develop 
administrative law through its decisions.42 
Since the creation of the WTO, NGO demand for more transparency in its 
decisionmaking has been growing.  The norm-setting process within the WTO 
involves all member states and is mainly an informal, behind-the-scenes process 
of negotiation and consultation.  Article 6 of the 1996 WTO General Council’s 
Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions emphasizes “the special character of the WTO, which is both a legally 
binding intergovernmental treaty of rights and obligations among its Members 
and a forum for negotiations” and points out the “broadly held view that it 
would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO 
or its meetings.”43  This informal prescriptive process remains largely opaque to 
civil society.  Indeed, NGOs representing diverse interests can sometimes use 
this opacity to present their views and gather information,44 but their influence 
remains a matter of discretion for states who find it opportune to support 
NGOs in a selective, ad-hoc manner.45 
Improved transparency in WTO decisionmaking processes has become a 
North-South issue.  Canada, Norway and the United States have suggested inter 
alia that observers be allowed to attend General Council and other committee 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. For recent analyses of the AB’s lawmaking capacities and their constitutional implications, see 
Weiler, supra note 5; Steinberg, supra note 5. 
 43. WTO General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organizations, Decision adopted by the General Council on 18 July 1996, WT/L/162 (July 23, 1996) (on 
file with Law & Contemp. Probs), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language= 
1&_=1. 
 44. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate over NGO Participation at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L 
ECON. LAW 433 (1998).  For an appraisal of the debate see Eric Stein, International Integration and 
Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 489, 504-09 (2001). 
 45. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The 
Case of Drugs 13-15 (Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Working Paper No. 6, 2005) (on file with Law & 
Contemp. Probs.), at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=taulwps (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
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meetings, including the Trade Policy Review meetings, in which members’ poli-
cies are reviewed for conformity with WTO rules.46  Other suggestions included 
the establishment of forums to enable open dialogue between WTO bodies and 
NGOs, the inclusion of advice of legislators from member states and of experts 
in specialized areas, and the creation of ad-hoc advisory boards to provide non-
binding NGO advice on a variety of issues.47  Southern states demur, however, 
and insist on restricting public participation to the passive role of receiving in-
formation from WTO bodies rather than communicating it to the WTO.48 
As might have been predicted by the insights elaborated above, the impasse 
at the political institutions of the WTO creates a power vacuum that the institu-
tion’s adjudicative body, the AB, can exploit by formalizing the decisionmaking 
processes.  The main area of attention in this respect has so far been the proce-
dures within the judicial organs themselves.  In contrast to most other interna-
tional adjudication procedures, those of the WTO remain shrouded in secrecy.  
Litigation before the Panels and the AB is closed both to WTO members that 
are not parties to the litigation and to the general public.  Calls for transparency 
thus focus on making all parties’ submissions available to the public and on 
enabling the general public to observe the proceedings using various tools, in-
cluding web-casting.  Moreover, suggestions for enabling the flow of communi-
cation from the public to the adjudicators concentrate on the possibility of sub-
mitting amicus briefs to the panel and the appellate bodies. 
Here again one can trace a North–South tension, with Northern members 
strongly supporting open and accessible proceedings to the dismay of Southern 
states.  The United States is the most ardent supporter of transparency and 
communication in the dispute settlement process.49  In fact, it was the first—and 
so far the only—state that presented NGO briefs as an integral part of its brief 
 
 46. WTO General Council, General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency, 
Submission from the United States, WT/GC/W/413 (Oct. 10, 2000), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.); WTO 
General Council, WTO External Transparency, Informal Paper by Canada, WT/GC/W/415 (Oct. 17, 
2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp? 
language=1&_=1; WTO General Council, External Transparency, Communication from Norway, 
WT/GC/W/419 (Nov. 2, 2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/ gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
 47. See in particular the Canadian paper, supra note 46. 
 48. See, e.g., WTO General Council, WTO: External Transparency, Communication from Hong 
Kong, China, WT/GC/W/418 (Oct. 31, 2000) (describing the position of Hong-Kong, China on this mat-
ter and elaborating on the distinction between external transparency and direct participation) (on file 
with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
In particular, the Hong Kong communication states, “We are not convinced of the desirability of adopt-
ing proposals which seek to make provisions for direct participation of the civil society in the Organiza-
tion in this exercise.  Such proposals go against the inter-governmental nature of the WTO, risk politi-
cising the operations of the Organization due to sectoral and electoral interests, and undermine the 
rights and obligations of individual WTO Members.”  Id. 
 49. See General Council Informal Consultations on External Transparency, Submission from the 
United States, supra note 46. 
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while defending its environment-friendly, unilateral restrictions on trade against 
the complaint of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand.50 
The AB has shown a clear inclination to consider amicus briefs.51  In 1998 it 
decided it had the authority to accept NGO briefs in the Shrimp–Turtle dispute, 
briefs that at least one litigant—the United States—incorporated into its own  
briefs.52  In a later case, it explained its authority to do so, unabashedly reveling 
in the lawmakers’ silence: 
In considering this matter [of amicus briefs], we first note that nothing in the DSU or 
the Working Procedures specifically provides that the Appellate Body may accept and 
consider submissions or briefs from sources other than the participants and third par-
ticipants in an appeal.  On the other hand, neither the DSU nor the Working Procedures 
explicitly prohibit acceptance or consideration of such briefs. . . .  [Article 17.9 of the 
DSU] makes clear that the Appellate Body has broad authority to adopt procedural 
rules which do not conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered 
agreements. Therefore, we are of the opinion that as long as we act consistently with 
the provisions of the DSU and the covered agreements, we have the legal authority to 
decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that we believe is perti-
nent and useful in an appeal.53 
In a subsequent case the AB went even further.  In the midst of hearings, it in-
vited “any person” to file applications for leave to file briefs concerning the dis-
pute at hand.  The invitation, setting highly rigorous conditions for eligibility to 
file briefs, was posted on the WTO website on  November 8, 2000.54  The AB re-
ceived eleven applications for leave to file a written brief within the time limits 
specified.  It “carefully reviewed and considered each of these applications in 
accordance with the Additional Procedure and, in each case, decided to deny 
leave to file a written brief.”55 
What the AB does not recount in its report is that its invitation had sparked 
angry protests by a number of member states that questioned its authority to do 
 
 50. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp–Turtle] (concerning the U.S. 
prohibition on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products that were caught using methods 
considered by the US to adversely affect the population of sea turtles) (on file with Law & Contemp. 
Probs.), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp? language=1&_=1. 
 51. For analyses of the Panels’ and Appellate Body’s authority to consult amicus briefs, see Robert 
Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The Early Years 
of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA (COLLECTED COURSES OF THE 
ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW) 35, 48-51 (Joseph H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Amicus Curiae Briefs Before The WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, Jean Monnet Papers No. 2 (2001), 
at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010201.html. 
 52. See supra note 50. 
 53. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, at 14 (June 10, 2000) (emphasis added) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), 
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/ gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
 54. Appellate Body Communication, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.),  
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_ home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
 55. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (on file with Law & Contemp. 
Probs.),  available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1. 
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so.  A few members—reportedly Pakistan and Egypt, supported by India and 
Malaysia56—immediately reacted by requesting the Chair of the General Coun-
cil to convene a special meeting to discuss this issue.  At the meeting, which 
took place on  November 22, 2000, only a few days after the AB’s invitation to 
NGOs, several members expressed strong criticism, arguing that the AB had 
exceeded its authority.57  Although no final decision could be reached at the 
meeting, the AB’s ultimately unexplained decision to deny the requests to file 
briefs may very well reflect the furious reactions to its invitation.  Note, how-
ever, that despite those strong political reactions, the AB did not retract its 
principled approach, left the door open for future requests for third-party inter-
vention, and actually enabled them in a subsequent case.58 
Another significant contribution of the AB in the context of administrative 
procedure is the recognition of a right of hearing during national legislation 
proceedings for potentially affected foreign interest groups.  In its Shrimp–
Turtle report, the AB elaborated, inter alia, on the meaning of the reference in 
Article XX of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)59 to 
“arbitrary discrimination.”  It insisted that the United States, in prescribing laws 
that have effects on foreign traders, had to provide administrative procedures 
pursuant to which foreign governments and traders would be able to comment 
on and challenge the application of such laws before U.S. institutions, either 
administrative bodies or courts.  The AB held that a law enforcement process 
that is not “transparent” or “predictable” is “arbitrary” because it does not pro-
vide any “formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to re-
spond to any arguments that may be made against it.”  It also noted that the 
U.S. implementing agency issues “no formal written, reasoned decision, 
whether of acceptance or rejection,” and that there is no “procedure for review 
of, or appeal from, a denial of an application.”  The AB also cited Article X of 
GATT 199460 as requiring the United States to grant foreign traders and coun-
tries their “due process” rights.61  Following the report, the United States an-
nounced it would revise its procedures and offer foreign governments greater 
 
 56. US in Murky Waters Over Shrimp-Turtle, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Nov. 21, 
2000 (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), at http://www.newsbulletin.org/getbulletin.cfm?bulletin_ 
ID=14&issue_ID=1685&browse=1& SID= (last visited Feb. 18, 2005). 
 57. See, e.g., Decision by the Appellate Body, Statement by Uruguay at the General Council on 22 
November 2000, WT/GC/38 (Dec. 4, 2000) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp? language=1&_=1. 
 58. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R, at 35-38 (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp? language=1&_=1.  “We find that we have the authority to 
accept the brief filed by a private individual, and to consider it.  We also find that the brief submitted by 
a private individual does not assist us in this appeal.”  Id. 
 59. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mutilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 1149. 
 61. See Shrimp–Turtle, supra note 50, at 72-75. 
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“due process” rights, including the right to challenge “preliminary” findings be-
fore they become definitive.62 
It remains to be seen whether the AB will constrain the political organs of 
the WTO themselves by imposing procedural requirements on them.  After de-
veloping procedural norms concerning its own decisionmaking procedures and 
individual states, the next step cannot be ruled out as impossible. 
C. The United Nations 
Article 92 of the U.N. Charter provides that the ICJ shall be the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations.  As such, it theoretically has the opportu-
nity to develop administrative law for the operation of the institution’s various 
internal organs, and in particular, to provide for judicial review of decisions 
taken by the Security Council.  In theory, the ICJ might have settled several 
questions related to the functioning of the various organs of the U.N.  It could 
have stated whether the abstention of a Permanent Member at the Security 
Council amounted to a “no” vote, and whether and under what conditions the 
General Assembly may issue “Uniting for Peace” Resolutions; it could have re-
quired more transparency at the Security Council; it could even have subjected 
resolutions of the Security Council to scrutiny under general international law.  
The ICJ approached this role with nuanced sensitivity to the concerns of the 
member states, in particular those of the Permanent Five who have little inter-
est in such an active role, which almost certainly would have destroyed the deli-
cate balance between power and legality within this institution. 
Initially the ICJ agreed to examine the decision of the General Assembly to 
set up the U.N. Administrative Tribunal in great detail.63  The ICJ extolled the 
merits of the tribunal and approved its creation, finding implicit authority in the 
U.N. Charter.64  However, it later signaled its disinclination to serve as the judi-
cial review organ of the U.N.65  When Security Council Resolutions aimed at re-
storing “international peace and security” under Chapter 7 came to the fore, the 
ICJ backed down.  Despite much scholarly criticism,66 the ICJ did not accept the 
 
 62. Gregory Shaffer, International Trade–WTO–Quantitative Restrictions–Environmental Protec-
tion–Endangered Species–U.S. Import Ban on Shrimp, 93 AM. J. INT’L .L. 507, 513 (1999). 
 63. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 
I.C.J. 47 (July 13). 
 64. Id. at 57. 
 65. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, at 45 (June 21) 
(“Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of decisions 
taken by the United Nations organs concerned.”). 
 66. A sample of this rich debate includes Jose E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM .J. 
INT’L L. 1 (1996); Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of Jus-
tice and Its Powers of Judicial Review, 7 PACE INT’L L. R. 281 (1995); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Re-
lationship Between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in Light of the Lockerbie 
Case, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 643 (1994); W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Na-
tions, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 83 (1993); Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and the 
World Court, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1993); Thomas M. Franck, The “Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is 
the Ultimate Guardian of UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 519 (1992); Edward McWhinney, The Inter-
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invitation to second-guess the legality of the Security Council’s Resolution to 
impose sanctions on Libya.67  It did accept the request of the General Assem-
bly68 to give an advisory opinion on the “Legal Consequences of the Construc-
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,”69 despite the Security 
Council’s earlier resolution on “the situation in the Middle East, including the 
Palestinian question,” to “remain seized of this matter.”70  But the ICJ went out 
of its way to emphasize the extraordinary circumstances of this singular situa-
tion so that its opinion would not be viewed as a challenge to the Security 
Council’s authority and so set a precedent for future intervention.71 
The same judicial hesitation to review the legality of Security Council Reso-
lutions is shared by other domestic and international courts.  These courts have 
had the opportunity to address such questions indirectly, as when examining the 
obligation of their governments to comply with a Security Council Resolution 
or their own competence to adjudicate a matter.  For example, the ICTY, a 
creation of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII, had to decide on its 
own competence.72  It accepted its own authority to decide upon this matter, but 
given the wide discretion of the Security Council under the Charter and the in-
cidental type of its jurisdiction, it asserted a rather lenient basis for review—
”cases where there might be a manifest contradiction [between the Resolution 
and] the Principles and Purposes of the Charter”73—and rejected the challenges 
against its legality using language concerning the wide discretion of the SC, 
which the Permanent Five were certainly pleased to read.  The Dutch court, 
faced with a similar challenge, refused to deliver an independent ruling on these 
matters and deferred to the ICTY’s decision.74 
 
national Court as Emerging Constitutional Court and the Co-ordinate UN Institutions (Especially the 
Security Council): Implications of the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, 1992 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 261. 
 67. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 2, at 15 (Apr. 14) (Request 
For The Indication Of Provisional Measures, 14 April 1992). 
 68. G.A. Res. ES-10/L.16, U.N. GAOR, 10th Emerg. Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/ ES-10/L.16 (2003). 
 69. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 
I.C.J. 136 (2004). 
 70. S.C. Res. 1515, SCOR, 58th Sess., 4862d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (2003). 
 71. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
note 69, at ¶¶ 49-50 (“The responsibility of the United Nations in this matter also has its origin in the 
Mandate and the Partition Resolution concerning Palestine. . . .  This responsibility has been described 
by the General Assembly as ‘a permanent responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the 
question is resolved in all its aspects in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legiti-
macy’. . . .  The object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion which the 
General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions.  The opinion is re-
quested on a question which is of particularly acute concern to the United Nations. . . .”). 
 72. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, at ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former 
Yugoslavia 1995) (on file with Law & Contemp. Probs.), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm.  For criticism of the decision, see Jose E. Al-
varez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 245 (1996). 
 73. Dusko Tadic, at ¶ 21. 
 74. Slobodan Milosevic v. The State of The Netherlands, 41 I.L.R. 86 (Dist. Ct. Civ. L. Div. 2001) 
(The Hague). 
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V 
THE ICJ AND THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The ICJ’s other role is the settlement of interstate disputes.  Operating in 
this role, the ICJ has the opportunity to impose procedural obligations upon 
states, whether through the restatement of customary international law or the 
interpretation of treaties.  As such, the ICJ is in a unique position to change the 
default rules for state parties who negotiate treaties that establish institutions.  
It can enhance the procedural legal aspects of such institutions while interpret-
ing the treaties that set them up. 
Take for example the ICJ’s 1997 decision in the Gabcikovo-Nagimaros case75 
between Hungary and Slovakia concerning the implementation of a treaty be-
tween the two countries on the utilization of the Danube River.  That decision 
transformed international law on trans-boundary resources through its empha-
sis on the bilateral duty of parties to cooperate in the management of these re-
sources.  The decision reflects the ICJ’s awareness of the literature analyzing 
the question involved in the case as one calling for the use of collective action, 
and its opinion is clearly an attempt to force the two litigant states into coopera-
tion: 
It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of these negotiations 
to be conducted by the Parties.  It is for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solu-
tion that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be pursued in a 
joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental law and 
the principles of the law of international watercourses.76 
Such cooperation through a joint regime, the court reasons, “will also reflect in 
an optimal way the concept of common utilization of shared water resources for 
the achievement of the several objectives mentioned in the [bilateral Treaty], in 
concordance with Article 5, paragraph 2, of the [1997 Watercourses Conven-
tion].”77 
Debates in recent years concerning institutional design reflect wide schol-
arly agreement that joint regimes for the management of trans-boundary natu-
ral resources could provide more structured and transparent treaty negotiation 
and decisionmaking processes.78  Structured processes can significantly limit the 
opportunities of domestic interest groups, bureaucrats, and politicians to pursue 
short-term sectarian goals to the detriment of society at large and future genera-
tions. Accordingly, similarly situated developed democracies readily adopt 
strong procedural rules.  The member states of the Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE) demonstrated their interest in such rules in the context of re-
 
 75. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7. 
 76. Id. at 78. 
 77. Id. at 80. 
 78. See EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 131-55 (2002) (discussing the structure and procedure of institutions 
for trans-boundary ecosystem management). 
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gional cooperation over environmental protection.79  At the same time, how-
ever, it is difficult to achieve global consensus on the need to develop interna-
tional law to provide for such procedural rules.  Thus, the framers of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention failed to offer such rules despite the urgings of the 
various ILC rapporteurs and strong academic criticism.80  It may be assumed 
that the ICJ was aware of this scholarly debate and of the global legislative im-
passe, and tried in its decision to move governments toward more structured 
management of their shared resources.81  It is likely that the same motivation—
to enhance regional cooperation and to provide for sustainable use of shared 
resources—will in due course lead the court to elaborate further on procedural 
norms, which are so important for the effective management of such institu-
tions. 
Just like the ECJ and the WTO Appellate Body, the ICJ has the opportu-
nity to “exploit” the power vacuum that results from disagreement among the 
state parties, hence their difficulties—when such disagreement exists—in annul-
ling its decisions.  Therefore, it constitutes an effective mechanism for legislat-
ing, through treaty interpretation and through the evolution of the elusive con-
cept of customary international law, new international administrative law 
obligations that states would have had great difficulty agreeing upon through 
multilateral bargaining.82  The ICJ should explore this opportunity cautiously: 
procedures must be carefully attuned to the existing balance of powers within 
each institution and must take into consideration the possible reaction of state 
parties whose interests are compromised as a result. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Both the contents of administrative norms and their authorship reflect the 
balance of power within international institutions in much the same way that 
these norms reflect the domestic balance of power.  Similarly, the contents of 
administrative law will vary according to the specific relations between the dif-
 
 79. The preamble to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, adopted in Aarhus, Denmark on June 25, 1998, 
by member states of the Economic Commission for Europe and other European states, emphasizes 
these points: “Recognizing that, in the field of the environment, improved access to information and 
public participation in decisionmaking enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, con-
tribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its con-
cerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns, aiming thereby to further the 
accountability of and transparency in decisionmaking and to strengthen public support for decisions on 
the environment. . . .”  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 571. 
 80. Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of 
International Water Resources Law, 90 AM .J. INT’L L. 384, 412-14 (1996). 
 81. BENVENISTI, supra note 78, at 185-86. 
 82. Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85 (Eyal Benvenisti & 
Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004). 
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ferent actors in each institution.  In fact, we should anticipate different adminis-
trative norms even within a single institution, depending on the issue being 
regulated.  Therefore, the comparative study of the evolution of administrative 
law in international institutions should not assume facile comparisons and gen-
eralities.  One must be sensitive to the specific political constraints and the fac-
tors influencing the balance of power within the institution and the balance of 
power among state parties to the institution.  Any attempt to develop a unified 
administrative international law must remain acutely attuned to the specific 
constraints within each institution.  At the same time, however, one must take 
into account the possibility of cross-institutional influences and pressures that 
may create a pull towards either conformity with general rules of administrative 
law or divergence, as well as administrative lawmaking by the ICJ that could 
serve as general default rules. 
A lack of administrative norms in the legal instruments establishing an in-
ternational institution need not signify that the institution will have none.  The 
adjudicative bodies surveyed here demonstrate an ability to exploit the “legisla-
tive impasse” experienced by the institutions in which they operate so as to im-
pose constraints on the legislators’ control of the decisionmaking process.  Dis-
agreements among the state parties of international organizations open the 
door for the judicial organs to exercise judicial activism.  Such activism may 
have distributional implications, although these will be couched in seemingly 
neutral procedural rules.  Governments that abhor constraints on their discre-
tion should consider, when setting up such institutions, the elimination or at 
least considerable weakening of the judicial functions. 
